Oxymorons

This is my first post here for a very long time and I have removed all previous posts so this is effectively an entirely new blog. I will post here everything that is related to my ongoing dissertation project on practical reasons and other projects related to academic philosophy like my future publications (hopefully there will be any!), book and article recommendations, conferences and events I plan to attend, etc.

I am currently working on two related topics, practical reasons and the normativity of rationality. The former concerns the debate between objectivists and subjectivists about reasons and the latter concerns the (feasibility of the) question whether we have reasons to follow the requirements of rationality. I have been working on the normativity of rationality for some time and presented a paper on this topic titled Let’s Be Rational at a graduate conference at Rutgers University in May 2008. It is still very much a work in progress but if you would like to read the latest draft please e-mail me at fritz-anton.fritzson@fil.lu.se.

Let me briefly tell you something about the other topic of mine; the debate between objectivists and subjectivists about reasons. I am currently studying Derek Parfit’s On What Matters on these matters. Parfit’s main objective in part one of this manuscript is to reject all subjectivist theories about reasons for action and argue instead in favour of some objectivist theory. Whereas subjectivist theories hold that reasons for action are all provided by facts about what would best fulfil the agent’s present wants, desires, aims, etc., objectivist theories hold that no reasons for action are provided by such facts, but are instead all provided by facts about which possible outcomes are and are not objectively worth achieving.

So according to objectivist views, our practical reasons are provided by facts about outcomes. On such views, there are certain facts that, in Parfit’s words, “make certain outcomes worth producing or preventing, or make certain things worth doing for their own sake”[1] Parfit also calls objectivist views value-based views about reasons since, on such views, reasons depend on facts about what makes outcomes objectively good or bad.[2]

According to subjectivist views, on the other hand, reasons depend instead on facts about the agent (whose reasons they are), about what would fulfil his or her present wants and desires or achieve his or her goals and aims. Accordingly, Parfit calls subjectivist views desire-based or aim-based views about reasons.[3]

The subjectivist views have been subject to much criticism in recent times and even though many consider it the traditional or default view, it is presently under heavy attack. Parfit’s intention is to reject all subjective theories. In the light of arguments provided by Parfit and other writers, I wish to show that, contrary to the intentions of these writes, the objective and the subjective views are at least on a par. My strategy is to show how objections against subjective views fail to prove that there is something of great importance that objective/value-based views can, while subjective/aim or desire-based views cannot, account for. In that sense these views are equally acceptable. In deciding between the two views, then, we will have to turn to other considerations such as ontological economy and how well these views fit with plausible substantive moral theories. I suspect that in the end the subjective views will “win”, but I will not argue directly for that in my present work.

It is true that objectivist theories can account for some things that subjectivist theories cannot account for. But subjectivists can plausibly claim, I argue, that these things cannot and need not be accounted for. One central pillar in Parfit’s argumentation is his insistence that things matter from an impersonal point of view; or from “the point of view of the universe”. He takes it to be a major flaw in subjectivist theories that they cannot account for and embrace this idea. Parfit discusses only what matters; he takes it for granted that some things matter.

I believe that it doesn’t matter that nothing matters from an impersonal point of view. Things matter and matter greatly, from each person’s point of view and this is enough to make it the case that each person has reason to respect her fellows. Morality is not threatened by the idea that nothing matters from an impersonal perspective because morality can be seen, not as something impersonal, but as something interpersonal. On this alternative view, morality is not concerned with achieving and maintaining certain objectively good outcomes, but rather that each person have reasons to respect certain moral constraints in her dealings with others. This is enough to understand and justify morality on a subjectivist view of reasons.

Further, Parfit seems to think that for the subjectivist it is a matter of reluctantly accepting that nothing matters from an impersonal perspective in order to save the subjectivist theory. But rather, the idea that nothing matters from an impersonal point of view has independent appeal. To me at least, the opposite idea, the idea that things matter from “the point of view of the universe” has religious connotations. And Parfit himself intends his ethics to be secular. I see the idea that nothing matters from an impersonal point of view as a perfectly legitimate starting point and even motivation behind the subjectivist view and not as a bullet that must be bitten.

It is possible to see the question of whether things matter from an impersonal perspective or not as analogues with the question of whether God exists or not. For some people it is just obvious that God exists and for some others it is equally obvious that he does not. Theists have often wanted to prove how morality depends on God, and similarly philosophers have tried to show how morality depends on the idea that things matter from an impersonal perspective; from “the point of view of the universe”; from “the view from nowhere”, etc.

I will write more as work (hopefully) progresses. I will be thankful for any comments on these rough first ideas.

[1] Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. (p 44).

[2] Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. (p 44).

[3] Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. (p 44).